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conducted from 2005–2008 at Maastricht University, The Netherlands.riments are currently performed to examine the feasibility of several types of nuclear transfer to prevent
A) disorders. Whereas the two most promising types of nuclear transfer to prevent mtDNA disorders,
spindle transfer and pronuclear transfer, do not amount to reproductive cloning, one theoretical variant, blastomere transfer does.
This seems the most challenging both technically and ethically. It is prohibited by many jurisdictions and also the scientific commu-
nity seems to avoid it. Nevertheless, this paper examines the moral acceptability of blastomere transfer as a method to prevent
mtDNA disorders. The reason for doing so is that most objections against reproductive cloning refer to reproductive adult cloning,
while blastomere transfer would amount to reproductive embryo cloning. After clarifying this conceptual difference, this paper
examines whether the main non-safety objections brought forward against reproductive cloning also apply in the context of blas-
tomere transfer. The conclusion is that if this variant were to become safe and effective, dismissing it because it would involve
reproductive cloning is unjustified. Nevertheless, as it may lead to more complex ethical appraisals than the other variants,
researchers should initially focus on the development of the other types of nuclear transfer to prevent mtDNA disorders. RBMOnline
ª 2010, Reproductive Healthcare Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) disorders are usually severe dis-
orders, caused by defects in energy production. Patients
show a wide variety of symptoms, but generally the most
energy-demanding tissues, such as the central nervouster ª 2010, Reproductive Healthcare Ltd.
.016system, heart and skeletal muscles, liver and kidney, are
affected. As there is no curative treatment, helping carriers
of mtDNAmutations to have healthy children has been a cen-
tral focus of attention (Taylor and Turnbull, 2005). One
reproductive option to prevent the transmission of a mtDNA
mutation from mother to child that is currently in preclinicalPublished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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replacement’). In case of nuclear transfer to prevent mtDNA
disorders, the mtDNA (which is located outside the nucleus,
in the cytoplasm) is changed or replaced (Bredenoord et al.,
2008a). This should result in healthy offspring with the
nuclear genes of the parents, but without the mtDNA muta-
tion (Gardner et al., 2007). Nuclear transfer can in theory be
applied at different stages: before, during or after fertiliza-
tion (de Wert, 2000; Brown et al., 2006; Roberts, 1999).
Germinal vesicle transfer
This would involve transfer of the germinal vesicle, removed
from a recipient woman’s immature oocyte, into an enucle-
ated donor oocyte. Subsequently, the reconstructed oocyte
will be matured and fertilized in vitro using a spermatozoon
from the partner. The resulting embryo is then transferred
to the prospective mother’s womb.
Germinal vesicle transfer has not been applied clinically
and is not considered to be one of the most promising types
of nuclear transfer, particularly because its efficacy is
doubted due to the poor developmental competence of
in-vitro matured oocytes (Fulka et al., 2005; Taylor and
Turnbull, 2005; Brown et al., 2006).
Spindle transfer
This would involve transfer of the chromosome–spindle
complex, removed from a recipient woman’s oocyte when
the nucleus is undergoing the second division of meiosis, into
an enucleated donor oocyte (Brown et al., 2006). Subse-
quently, the reconstructed oocyte will be fertilized using a
spermatozoon from the partner. The resulting embryo is
then transferred to the prospective mother’s womb. As
mature oocytes do not have a nuclear membrane, there
was earlier scepticism about the safety of transfer at this
stage (Brown et al., 2006). Recent studies, though, are
promising. Tachibana et al. (2009) showed that spindle
transfer is technically feasible in non-human primates: they
transferred the chromosome–spindle complex of a mature
oocyte to an enucleated donor oocyte, resulting in three
thus-far healthy macaque infants, with minimal levels of
carry-over of nuclear donor mtDNA.
Pronuclear transfer
This would involve transfer at the zygote stage (Brown et al.,
2006; Craven et al., 2010). An oocyte of the prospective
mother is fertilized using a spermatozoon from the partner,
as well as a donated oocyte of a healthy woman (the oocytes
have to be at the same stage). When the oocytes are ‘half
fertilized’, the two pronuclei (distinct structures that
become apparent after fertilization) are taken out of the
donated zygote. Subsequently, the pronuclei of the inten-
tional parents (containing their nuclear DNA) are transferred
to the enucleated donor zygote. The resulting embryo is then
transferred to the prospective mother’s womb.
Studies suggest the safety and efficacy of pronuclear
transfer in preventing the transmission of mutated mtDNA
in a mouse model (Jenuth et al., 1996; Meirelles and Smith,1997, 1998; Sato et al., 2005). A technical advantage is that
during this stage the chromosomes are packed into the pro-
nuclei, which would make it easier to collect and transfer
them (Taylor and Turnbull, 2005). On the other hand,
mitochondria surrounding the pronuclei may increase the
amount of pathogenic mtDNA transplanted from the donor
into the recipient zygote. Recent preclinical studies have
shown that pronuclear transfer is feasible in human
oocytes, resulting in embryos with minimal levels of
carry-over of nuclear donor mtDNA (far below the threshold
of disease expression) (Craven et al., 2010). A clinical appli-
cation of pronuclear transfer has been reported once,
resulting in a triplet pregnancy but no life birth (Zhang
et al., 2003).
Blastomere transfer
The nuclear DNA of a donated oocyte from a healthy woman
is removed. An oocyte of the prospective mother is fertil-
ized using a spermatozoon from the partner. A blastomere
of the resulting embryo is then transferred to the enucle-
ated donor oocyte. Subsequently, the resulting embryo is
transferred to the prospective mother’s womb (Roberts,
1999).
Blastomere transfer has not been applied clinically.
Some expect the success rate of nuclear transfer using a
blastomere of an embryo to be much lower than nuclear
transfer at the other stages, particularly because animal
studies showed evidence of high heteroplasmy levels: the
co-existence of mutant and normal mtDNA in an affected
individual (Steinborn et al., 1998, 2000; Hiendleder et al.,
1999; Ferreira et al., 2007). In addition, the resulting
embryo may have a poor developmental competence
(Roberts, 1999; Spikings et al., 2006), although higher rates
of development are observed with embryonic-cell compared
with somatic-cell nuclear transfer (Mitalipov et al., 2002).
These technical impediments make whole blastomere
transfer currently less suitable and promising than spindle
or pronuclear transfer.
Although remaining technical and ethical difficulties need
further attention, both spindle transfer and pronuclear trans-
fer are promising future reproductive options for carriers of
mtDNAmutations (Poulton et al., 2010; Poulton and Bredeno-
ord, 2010). In addition, both these variants of nuclear transfer
would not amount to reproductive cloning. On the contrary,
blastomere transfer could. This type seems both technically
and ethically themost challenging variant of nuclear transfer
to prevent mtDNA disorders. The scientific community seems
to avoid it, perhaps also in response to the fact that many
jurisdictions have prohibited this variant because it may
involve reproductive cloning. For example, when the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) had to decide
on the research licence for experiments on pronuclear trans-
fer, it explicitly mentioned that transfer of a nucleus of a cell
of an embryo is prohibited (which, depending on the defini-
tion, could be perceived as reproductive cloning; see below)
(HFEA summary decision RO153).
Notwithstanding the poor technical performance of
blastomere transfer to prevent mtDNA disorders and its
avoidance by scientists, this paper discusses the moral
acceptability of blastomere transfer as a method to prevent
202 AL Bredenoord et al.mtDNA disorders. The rationale for doing so is that it is
worthwhile to have a conceptual and ethical discussion of
this technique: most if not all moral objections that have
been raised against reproductive cloning refer to reproduc-
tive adult cloning, while blastomere transfer would amount
to reproductive embryo cloning (REC). Suppose that blasto-
mere transfer turns out to be feasible and safe. The ques-
tion then becomes whether researchers and regulatory
authorities rightly exclude blastomere transfer as a possible
reproductive option for carriers of mtDNA mutations with
the argument that it may imply REC. If not, researchers
should not feel impeded by this argument to consider and
develop this option. This paper examines whether and to
what extent the main objections brought forward against
reproductive cloning also apply in the context of blastomere
transfer. It will presuppose the safety of the relevant forms
of reproductive cloning as a preliminary condition and focus
on the objections of principle.Reproductive (embryo) cloning
Strictly speaking, cloning means the production of a
genetic copy. This paper refers to reproductive cloning
as all applications of human cloning that result in the birth
of a child genetically identical to an embryo or a born
individual (Bredenoord et al., 2008a). In contrast to
reproductive adult cloning, where the clone is a ‘copy’
of an individual made after his or her birth, the original
cell in the application of nuclear transfer in question
would be derived from an embryo. This would therefore
be an instance of REC.
Whereas the types of nuclear transfer to prevent mtDNA
disorders currently under development (spindle transfer
and pronuclear transfer) do not involve REC, blastomere
transfer could. It entails the transfer of the nucleus of a
blastomere to an enucleated oocyte. This results in two
identical embryos. If an 8-cell blastomere would be used,
up to eight blastomere nuclei may be used to create iden-
tical embryos. If those embryos are subsequently trans-
ferred to the womb, this may result in the birth of
children genetically identical both to the original embryo
and to each other. Following the above definition of repro-
ductive cloning, a child is still to be considered a clone if it
is the only individual ever born as a result from copying
the original embryo. Following a more narrow definition,
this is not the case. According to this alternative definition
of reproductive cloning, being a clone presupposes genetic
identity with at least one other born individual. Whereas
the first (broader) definition refers to the fact that a child
is the result of genetic copying, the second looks at the
consequence of the procedure: the birth of genetically
identical individuals. According to the latter definition,
whether blastomere transfer implies REC depends on (i)
the number of embryos transferred and (ii) whether this
leads to a pregnancy and live birth of at least two (identi-
cal) children. If only one cloned embryo is transferred to
the womb and the embryo does not split, this will not
result in the birth of genetically identical children. If, how-
ever, more embryos are transferred, this may result in the
birth of several clones.Do moral objections against reproductive
cloning also apply to blastomere transfer in the
context of mtDNA-disease?
As it is clear that blastomere transfer may indeed amount to
reproductive cloning, the moral significance of this concep-
tual conclusion needs to be addressed. This section will
briefly discuss the main moral objections that are brought
against reproductive cloning. The question to be answered
is whether those objections amount to valid moral argu-
ments against nuclear transfer aimed at preventing the
transmission of mtDNA disease.
‘It is repugnant and unnatural’
A first objection against reproductive cloning is that it
would be repugnant. According to Kass (2002), repugnance
may be the expression of wisdom, beyond reason’s power
to articulate why something would be wrong. If, and insofar
as, Kass means that emotional reactions should not directly
be dismissed as they may point to important considerations
that otherwise may be overlooked, then the current paper
agrees. However, the second step should always be to sub-
ject these emotions to rational analysis, because otherwise
it would imply a permit for moral prejudice (Nussbaum,
2004). The critical scrutiny of arguments is precisely neces-
sary to prevent ethics to get bogged down in gut feelings.
After all, moral feelings may be misleading and send one
in the wrong direction. For example, some people may have
strong moral feelings about homosexuality or about the
inferiority of some sections of the population. Ethical
reflection and analysis may teach convincing arguments
are needed to hold and defend such a position (Gillon,
1999).
An adjacent variant of this objection is that reproductive
cloning would be unnatural or artificial. There has been an
extensive debate on this so-called argument of nature, with
the dominant conclusion that it is fallacious. In the context
of reproductive cloning, Fukuyama (2002), for example, has
deployed this argument. He calls for an absolute prohibition
of reproductive cloning because it involves a highly
unnatural form of reproduction. This seems rather thin as
a counterargument, requiring further explanation of why
unnaturalness would be morally problematic or relevant.
Unnaturalness as such cannot be a valid argument – if it
were taken seriously, humans should stop practicing medi-
cine (and many other activities).
The proponents of these objections will probably also
regard reproductive cloning in the context of mtDNA disease
to be repugnant and unnatural – Kass (2002), for example,
calls for an absolute prohibition of all types of reproductive
cloning, REC included. For the reasons outlined above,
these objections are not held to be decisive neither in gen-
eral, nor in the context of mtDNA disease.
‘We are creatures, not creators’
The second possible objection expresses feelings of uneasi-
ness regarding human intervention in the creation and shap-
ing of future persons. This type of argument rests on the
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2003, p. 195). The transformation of human procreation
into manufacture, of begetting into making, would be prob-
lematic (President’s Council, 2002). For Sandel (2007),
genetic engineering is objectionable because it expresses
a stance of mastery and dominance to the world: ‘Genetic
engineering to create designer babies is the ultimate
expression of the hubris that marks the loss of reverence
for life as a gift’.
Hubris is a well-known theme in Greek tragedy, in which
the main actor, by challenging the gods or their laws, is
inevitably heading to his downfall. Similarly, by denouncing
genetic engineering (reproductive cloning included) as a
type of hubris, the objection is that these are acts of exces-
sive pride or arrogance that are likely to lead to nothing
good. This objection is not valid for two reasons.
First, the validity of the view depends on a contestable
normative anthropology. An anthropology that contends
that people should not explore the limits of their knowledge
and capacities, and that seems to summon people to know
their place. If one does not share this specific portrayal of
mankind, this argument is not convincing. Contrarily, this
paper would rather encourage people to explore new tech-
nology and new paths for curing disease rather than invoke
distrust of technology.
Second, insofar as this objection asserts that reverence
for life as a gift would eventually would be lost, it may actu-
ally be interpreted as a slippery slope argument. The ques-
tion is whether the dreaded position at the end of the slope
indeed would be morally unacceptable. Would it be prob-
lematic that people would not perceive life as a gift? And
does seeing life as a gift automatically imply that one should
not alter it, or that one should not reproduce in alternative
ways? If there would be a slippery slope here, the first steps
have been set long ago, with the introduction of assisted
reproduction treatment, which could be perceived as the
first steps ‘from chance to choice’. It is difficult to see
why reproductive cloning would be morally much different
from other artificial reproductive technologies used to pre-
vent genetic disease.‘It is a violation of human dignity’
A third line of objections against reproductive cloning holds
that it violates human dignity. Dignity is a much contested
and vague concept and no agreement on the meaning of
the term exists (President’s Council, 2008; van der Graaf
and van Delden, 2009). It is mostly used to indicate that
human beings have intrinsic moral worth, but this forces
one to specify what gives human beings this intrinsic worth
(Kass, 2008). Since human dignity comes in such competing
versions, it is understandable that authors have dismissed
the concept as useless or vague (Beyleveld and Brownsword,
2001; van der Graaf and van Delden, 2009). The current
paper will nevertheless try to scrutinize this objection by
using two opposed conceptions as formulated by Beyleveld
and Brownsword (2001): human dignity as empowerment
or as constraint. These two conceptions make clear that
human dignity can be deployed both in support of autonomy
and as a constraint on autonomy (Beyleveld and Brown-
sword, 2001).The first conception, human dignity as empowerment, is
particularly used in the post-Second World War interna-
tional treaties on human rights. The intrinsic dignity of
human beings is the foundational idea, the justification
for the recognition of human rights (Beyleveld and
Brownsword, 2001). As Caulfield and Brownsword (2006, p.
72) have put it: ‘In this reading, human dignity is an engine
of individual empowerment, reinforcing individual auton-
omy and the right to self-determination’. Insofar as human
dignity is equated with the capacity for autonomous action,
this understanding of human dignity will be discussed in the
next section, when autonomy and the right to an open
future are addressed.
The concept of human dignity is also and increasingly
used as a justification for condemning practices such as
reproductive cloning. Recent international treaties have
used human dignity in this way. The Council of Europe for
example states that the deliberate creation of genetically
identical human beings (i.e. reproductive cloning) is con-
trary to human dignity (CoE, 1998). The United Nations
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human
Rights states that ‘practices which are contrary to human
dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall
not be permitted’ (UNESCO 1997, art. 11; United Nations,
2005). Those treaties deploy human dignity as an argument
to reject reproductive cloning, but they do not further
explicate how human dignity is to be understood or what
its foundations are. It is, important that these treaties fur-
ther underpin why and how they use human dignity, in order
to enable a moral dialogue.‘It is a violation of the child’s right to an open
future’
A fourth line of objections is that reproductive cloning
would violate – what Feinberg (1980) in another context
coined – the child’s right to an open future. Although
debate is possible about the interpretation of this concept,
taking it as a negative anticipatory autonomy right would be
the most relevant and appropriate in our discussion. This
means a right to have one’s future options kept open until
one is capable of making one’s own decisions.
The strong version of this argument counsels that a
child’s right to an open future may be violated in the sense
that the clone has to live in the shadow of its ‘original’. The
child’s right to ignorance about its future would be violated,
as the clone, being genetically identical to someone else,
knows too much about itself (Jonas, 1974). The strong ver-
sion, however, is untenable: it rests on too strong an
account of genetic determinism. Genetic identity does not
equal personal identity (Gillon, 1999). The clones would
not be identical persons, as personality and character are
not determined by genetics alone, but by a complex interac-
tion of social, environmental and indeed genetic factors
(British Medical Association, 1999; Buchanan et al., 2000;
de Wert, 2000). Currently, existing monozygotic twins show
a broad range of similarities and dissimilarities, thus demon-
strating that sharing identical genotype and environment
does not result in identical persons (Harris, 1997). The
weaker version, however, should be taken more seriously.
This version of the argument counsels that the child’s right
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ing that it knows too much about itself (Holm, 1998).
It is useful to emphasize here that this argument is pri-
marily developed in the context of reproductive adult clon-
ing. What about its validity in the context of REC? This
argument would in any case not hold true in two situations
regarding REC. The first exception would be when only one
child is born. Following the more narrow definition of repro-
ductive cloning, the child is not to be regarded as a clone in
the first place, which means that the question whether clon-
ing would affect the child’s open future does not even arise.
Although in terms of the broader definition the resulting
child would indeed be a clone, this has no implications for
the moral acceptability of blastomere transfer, as the child
will not have to live with another ‘co-clone’. Being alone as
a clone, the child will not have to suffer from living in the
shadow of a genetically identical individual. The second
exception is when the twins, conceived by means of REC,
are born simultaneously; this would not be different from
identical twins in the natural course of events (which can
be considered as naturally occurring clones; British Medical
Association, 1999). Although they start their lives as genet-
ically identical twins, and although they may share many
characteristics, they also begin their biography at the same
time. They will thus be ignorant of the future choices of the
other (Buchanan et al., 2000).
Delayed twins
The main ethical bottleneck regarding REC concerns the
possible asynchrony between two (or more) cloned children.
What if, out of one single blastocyst, different embryos
would be made, cryopreserved for future use and trans-
ferred later? This could result in a ‘delayed twin’ (British
Medical Association, 1999): a clone with a (much) older
twin-brother or -sister (or several identical siblings). This
may indeed affect the sense of freedom of the delayed
twin. The delayed twin may experience psychological dis-
tress by growing up in the shadow of an older sibling. After
all, as the clones will grow up in the same family, they will
share not only identical DNA but also a similar environment.
If the delayed twin is transferred shortly after its older sib-
ling, they may differ only 1 or 2 years in age. The delayed
twin may (wrongly) think that the choices and the course
of life of its older twin is an inevitable path. Or perhaps
the parents may have this perception. It is not thought that
a clone’s right to an open future is violated merely because
he or she or his/her surroundings believe that a clone’s
future is already determined, given that this belief is based
on an erroneous genetic determinism (Brock, 2002). Never-
theless, the clone may still experience psychological stress.
The first question, then, is whether the delayed twin(s)
would have an acceptable quality of life. One could argue
here, following Parfit (1984), that as long as a child/clone
does not have a life so awful that it would be better off
dead, bringing it into existence will not harm the child. This
is because the alternative for this child would have been
non-existence (this child could only be born as a clone).
Insofar as violating the interests of the future child is con-
cerned, this line of reasoning is generally accepted. There
is, however, less consensus about whether this settles theissue with regard to justifying assisted reproduction.
Although no harm may be done in the sense of a violation
of the child’s interests, this does not make it a matter of
moral indifference what quality of life the child can be
expected to have (Arras, 1990; Steinbock and McClamrock,
1994; Parker, 2005; Glover, 2006; Bredenoord et al.,
2008b). It is still meaningful to say in a more general sense
that bringing a child into the world that will seriously suffer
is to cause avoidable harm. The reasonable welfare stan-
dard, which was defended earlier as the best way to take
into account the welfare of the child, allows assisted repro-
duction treatment (reproductive cloning and nuclear trans-
fer included) insofar as there is ‘no high risk of serious harm’
for the resulting child (de Wert, 1998; Pennings, 1999;
Bredenoord et al., 2008b). This standard entails the view
that for treatment to be justified, the child to be must have
a reasonable chance of an acceptable quality of life.
The question is whether the delayed twin would be at
high risk of serious psychosocial harm. Clearly, no hard evi-
dence exists. Nevertheless, it is doubted whether the
delayed twin will psychologically suffer to such an extent
that this provides a contraindication in light of the reason-
able welfare standard. Whether the twins differ 1 year or
20 years in age may also influence the psychological wellbe-
ing of the delayed twin, but also this is speculative. Some
have brought forward the view that the delayed twin may
even have an advantage, because he or she may learn from
the older twin (Brock, 1998). In any case, to conclude that
reproductive cloning would result in a high risk of serious
psychological harm for the child is premature. Nevertheless,
if people in the daily surroundings of the clones would treat
them as copies or negatively approach them, then psychoso-
cial harm would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Not
merely because the younger twin would feel restricted by
the older brother or sister, but because it would feel
restricted by the expectations and (negative) feelings in
his/her surroundings. So, this objection may become true
if it is allowed to be true.
In summary, this paper does not see overriding grounds
to reject blastomere transfer to prevent mtDNA disorders
beforehand, even when a delayed twin would be brought
into the world. However, it remains impossible to know
the precise psychosocial consequences for the resulting
children. Would it therefore be better to avoid the creation
of delayed twins as much as reasonably possible? This could
be achieved by transferring several cloned embryos simulta-
neously or by starting a new (stimulation/nuclear transfer)
cycle if a couple wishes to have another child.
Avoiding delayed twins by multiple embryo transfer
If several cloned embryos are transferred simultaneously,
the resulting children will start their lives simultaneously.
For reasons outlined above, it would seem that this will
not lead to psychological harm (for it is similar to naturally
occurring monozygotic twins). Transferring all blastomeres
of the embryo may in theory result in up to eight children.
What about the transfer of two, three or four embryos?
The dilemma would then be as follows. Transferring several
cloned embryos simultaneously may on the one hand avoid
possible psychological problems, but on the other hand
Nuclear transfer to prevent mitochondrial DNA disorders 205seriously increase medical complications (for the twins as
well as the mother) and parental stress (and this may in turn
cause stress in the children) (Braude, 2007). Furthermore,
data indicate that the quality of life of children born after
assisted reproduction treatment is higher if they are born
one at a time (Fauser et al., 2005). With regard to regular
IVF, a strong consensus exists that, because of the health
risks of multiple pregnancies, no more than two embryos
should be transferred – and the current tendency in IVF is
even heading towards single embryo transfer (Braude,
2007).
Whereas the psychological risks for delayed twins are
speculative, the psychological and health risks in the con-
text of multiple pregnancies are known to be substantial.
When balancing these, it is preferable to avoid the known
and substantial risks and to transfer only one or maximally
two cloned embryos simultaneously.
Avoiding delayed twins by starting a new cycle
Choosing to transfer only one or two cloned embryos leads to
the question what should be done with the remaining blasto-
meres or cloned embryos. One option would be to cryopre-
serve all cloned embryos. The question, of course, is
whether cryopreservation of these reconstructed embryos
would be feasible (the cryopreservation of biopsied
embryos, for example, has not been very successful so far),
but suppose it would be. The primary reason for doing this
would be to avoid having to start a new stimulation/nuclear
transfer cycle if after unsuccessful transfer the couple would
want a further try. But what if the procedure was successful
and 2 years later the parents return with the request to help
them expand their family? One option may then be to thaw
and transfer one of the cryopreserved embryos. The other
option would be to start a new stimulation/nuclear transfer
cycle. The dilemma here is whether avoiding delayed twins
compensates for the efforts, costs and risks of starting a
new stimulation/nuclear transfer cycle. When deciding
about this, the known risks and burdens of ovarian stimula-
tion have to be balanced with the speculative psychological
risks for the delayed twins. As no further data regarding
nuclear transfer are at hand, this appraisal cannot be done
at this moment. It is currently sufficient to conclude that,
although the fact that blastomere transfer involves repro-
ductive cloning is not considered to be a decisive objection,
it may in practice lead to complex ethical considerations.
Other things equal, this constitutes an argument that sup-
ports the current focus on the development of the other
types of nuclear transfer. In addition, those describing abso-
lute or high moral value to embryos will only accept germinal
vesicle transfer and spindle transfer, as these are the only
variants of nuclear transfer that would not involve the
destruction of a zygote or embryo – although the further
development of these techniques in the preclinical stage will
probably involve the creation and destruction of embryos for
research (Bredenoord et al., 2008a).
Conclusion
This paper has discussed the moral acceptability of
reproductive cloning in the context of blastomere transferto prevent mtDNA disorders. More specifically, it has dis-
cussed the acceptability of REC. It is concluded that there
are no arguments that render REC morally unjustified
beforehand. If blastomere transfer results in the birth of
one child, then (other things equal) this type of nuclear
transfer is ethically comparable to nuclear transfer using
oocytes or zygotes. The simultaneous birth of two (cloned)
twins should not be considered morally unjustified either.
Although bringing into existence a delayed twin raises con-
cerns about a child having to grow up in the shadow of an
older clone, it remains speculative whether this would lead
to psychosocial harm. The argument would therefore not
amount to a decisive objection against blastomere transfer.
On the other hand, the fact that the relevant concern is not
completely implausible either does provide, other things
equal, a reason to focus at least initially on the further
development of spindle transfer and pronuclear transfer.
After all, blastomere transfer may in clinical practice lead
to a complex appraisal of the relative weight of avoiding
delayed twins versus avoiding a multiple pregnancy or the
burden of starting a new stimulation/nuclear transfer cycle.
The fact that a specific version of nuclear transfer with
the aim of preventing the transmission of mtDNA disease
would possibly involve reproductive cloning cannot convinc-
ingly be construed as a categorical moral objection against
the possible use of this version of the technology. Of course,
the overall acceptability of using nuclear transfer for this
purpose would also depend on the safety and efficacy of
the procedure.
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